In the scholarship of international law there are a number of memorable defenses, made over the last several decades, of the value and importance of the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 1 for helping to prevent wildlife extinctions.
knowing full well that the next and upcoming CoP 17 would be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in the Fall of 2016, and that there the ability of the treaty to protect African elephants from extinction would be a particularly divisive issue, perhaps so divisive that it would tear apart the thin veneer of international agreement that has kept CITES alive for more than forty years.
as a useful part of the international law of wildlife, 14 not least by balancing, for example, the treaty's interest in protecting species in their natural environments, essentially as wild things, with its interest in allowing states, if that is their choice, to domesticate and farm wild things, which in the case of animals boils down to treating them much as if they were cattle or sheep. 15 The most recent of these re-framings tries to paint the saving of internationally iconic endangered species as first and foremost a problem involving the detection, prosecution, suppression, and eventual elimination of transnational environmental crimes. 16 Two very recent and hefty volumes address this topic, 17 and both make it very clear that their contents are buttressed by a large and diverse penumbra of literatures exploring such topics as the magnitude of the crimes, the nature and motivations of the criminals, the sophisticated international networks that sustain assaults on wildlife for ill-gotten gains, and the staggering amounts of money involved not just in the illegal trade in species and their parts but also in the legal trade as well. Amounts of money large enough, arguably, to make the promotion of illegal wildlife trade look attractive as a source of threat finance, or support for terrorists, who can't raise the money to pay for their operations from taxes or philanthropic grants. 18 This latest attempt to reframe the basic challenge that protecting species and avoiding extinctions poses for international law has attracted a star-studded and well-connected international cast, including members of the British royal family 19 and the Presidents of both China and the United States. 20 It has yielded large gifts of money, prompted chiefly by a desire to affirm and support the existence value of species. 21 But, while the resulting publicity focuses tremendous public and private attention on the plight of the elephant, the new ideas and resources it has unquestionably brought to bear also bring controversy.
Mobilizing the international community to fight transnational wildlife crime with sophisticated detection technologies, more wildlife ranger boots on the ground, and better personnel training and weaponry, for example, is tantamount to the militarization of conservation. 22 And it is not at all clear that this is either warranted or likely to be more effective than other ways of preventing wildlife crime, 23 even if the use of military means to accomplish conservation might be rationalized as a contribution to the fight against terrorism -a fight that presumptively unites the entire international community.
The strange thing in all of this is that, although much of the controversy about the best way to deal with illegal wildlife trade implicates CITES, 24 and swirls around the international conference halls where huge numbers of people and organizations congregate to participate in CITES proceedings of various sorts, 25 year after year, there are no provisions in the treaty itself that can be directly invoked to apply judicial sanctions to wildlife criminals. Moreover, apart from CITES there is no other international environmental law that can be invoked to counteract species loss from wildlife crime, and that is a large part of the reason why, despite its limitations, CITES continues to get so much attention.
20 "The United States and China commit to enact nearly complete bans on ivory import and export, including significant and timely restrictions on the import of ivory as hunting trophies, and to take significant and timely steps to halt the domestic commercial trade of ivory. The two sides decided to further cooperate in joint training, technical exchanges, information sharing, and public education on combating wildlife trafficking, and enhance international law enforcement cooperation in this field. CITES is an agreement among sovereign states to make trade in species legal and orderly as a matter of record, and safe and profitable for all concerned, and to prohibit trade only when it can be shown that otherwise legal trade is a threat per se to the continued existence of species known to be endangered. States failing to live up to their CITES obligations to keep track of their involvement and participation in trade can in theory be penalized for not fulfilling their reporting and conformance obligations 26 under the treaty, by having their participation in legal trade in species suspended, although this is not the way compliance typically plays out under CITES. Threats of trade sanctions against states for departures from treaty norms are more likely to be negotiated, extended, and forgiven on promise of more help, more money, and better behavior in the future.
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The real power of wildlife law to protect iconic species under threat, such as elephants, rhinos, leopards, and lions, among others, lies with domestic law, domestic police and rangers, domestic prosecutors, domestic courts, and domestic conservation bureaucracies, none of which make any significant appearance in the newly burgeoning literature on transnational environmental crime. 28 So, where did the notion that international law, including CITES, could be an effective bulwark against the power of trade to endanger and even extinguish species originate?
What has kept it alive for more than forty years? And is avoidance of extinction for the elephant, now an issue of unquestioned salience in Africa, where CITES CoP 17 will be held, one of the things that international law can accomplish?
Are scholars of international wildlife law who would like to find good law to ensure good outcomes for species under grave threat, such as the elephant, looking in the wrong place?
Imagining CITES as the Steady Erosion of Sovereignty
From the perspective of 1990 and following close on the heels of the Economist's blunt assertion to its global readership that CITES had proven "utterly powerless" to control the ivory trade 29 Michael Glennon saw that the problem of saving elephants as wild animals in Africa had both legal and political dimensions. Looked at politically, there was no powerful or consistent support among African states for treating elephants as if they were part of the common heritage of mankind. 30 On the contrary, some African states were quite comfortable dealing with elephants as exploitable natural resources, especially in a context in which the money earned, whether from hunting or the sale of ivory or perhaps tourism, would be a welcome addition to national income and might be expended, for example, on wildlife conservation programs. The legal challenge, then, was whether international law could be used to compel states to protect their elephants or other species -although elephants are the lodestar for CITES -and treat them almost entirely as non-consumptive goods, even if they didn't want to follow that path. And CITES was the obvious tool at hand for international lawyers to work this transformation.
So, Glennon sketched the textbook case for eroding state sovereignty in order to "protect wider humanitarian interests and prevent environmental degradation."
31 CITES needed to be understood, he said, as one of a number of focused treaties the international community had agreed to since the end of the Second World War to underline the fact that states no longer had carte blanche to do whatever they wanted within their own territory, either with respect to persons or the environment. Indeed, it was now possible to conclude, Glennon wrote, that "customary international law requires states to take appropriate steps to protect endangered species," 32 and that the relevant norms of international law had been created both by state practice and by convention. Moreover, he argued:
Because CITES requires domestic implementation by parties to it, and because the overall level of compliance seems quite high, the general principles embodied in states' domestic endangered species laws may be relied upon as another source of customary law. Even apart from the CITES requirements [accepted at the time Glennon was writing by 103 countries], states that lack laws protecting endangered species seem now to be the clear exception rather than the rule. That there exists opinio juris as to the binding character of this [state] obligation [to protect species] is suggested by the firm support given endangered species protection by the UN General Assembly and various international conferences (citations omitted). 33 Glennon was cautious in his judgment about the extent to which in 1990 South Africa and Zimbabwe, say, could be said to be prohibited from selling ivory by customary international law that corresponded to the trade restrictions agreed to in 1989 at CITES CoP 7 in Lausanne, when the African elephant was up-listed from Appendix II to the most trade restrictive Appendix I of CITES. But looking to the future, he argued the trend "cannot be doubted."
34 Probably sooner rather than later "the customary norm requiring states to protect endangered species" would take on "the character of an obligation erga omnes." And at that point international law would trump the politics of national resource sovereignty, because "obligations erga omnes…run to the international community as a whole; thus, their breach is actionable by any state since such matters are ' 31 , supra note 3, at 30. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 31-32. 34 Id. at 33. 35 
Appreciating CITES as Evolutionary Adaptation
In fact, things have not worked out the way Glennon imagined, even though the six-step program he outlined for saving the elephant, including a number of changes to CITES itself, 36 was prescient and well-received. By the time Peter Sand evaluated the past, present and future of the treaty regime in 1997, however, the possibility that CITES could eventually become a legal cause of action in a judicial forum by some countries in the world against other countries of the world had clearly given way to a very different paradigm. The prospect that the treaty might be used to compel compliance with obligations erga omnes against states recalcitrant in their treatment of species in trade, endangered species first among them, had passed. The watchwords at CITES had rather become bargaining, negotiation, compromise, and bureaucratic elaboration, 37 particularly in the face of repeated and strenuous assertions of the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources by African states who believed they had or could sustainably produce an "excess" of elephants. One could argue, and Sand did argue, 38 and others have since echoed the thought, 39 that things had reached this pass through a process of evolutionary adaptation.
When it turned out, for example, that there was not nearly enough money available to do all the things that needed to be done, CITES established some degree of sustainable financial independence from the United Nations Environment Program. 40 When it became clear that the work of the treaty as written could only be accomplished if new institutions, not contemplated in the treaty text, were created, subsidiary bodies, including an executive Standing Committee, were invented to help guide the work of the treaty between CoPs. 41 The parties to CITES learned to grapple, albeit not very forcibly, with the possibility of imposing sanctions against signatory states that failed to live up to their treaty commitments. 42 They learned how to tolerate deviations from treaty norms by allowing reservations from CoP decisions about the listing of species in the appendices to CITES and by acknowledging increasingly that there could be exceptions to conformance with the rules governing trade in species. 43 ed. 2010) (arguing that the success of CITES is largely attributable to its administrative system, which means there is "no chance" of it ever becoming a "sleeping sustainable use perspective developing countries brought to their management plans for wildlife and give it a greater role in setting criteria for listing species in the CITES appendices. 44 And they learned the value of serious and sustained investments in wildlife trade reporting and monitoring, as well as in compliance assistance, which means providing money and professional and technical help to countries that arguably cannot meet their CITES commitments without such help. 45 There was, in short, and over many years, a great deal of learning among the hundreds if not thousands of people and organizations involved in the day to day affairs of CITES, as well as in its interstitial administrative structures and growing number of states parties. And that learning was functionally adaptive inasmuch as, first, it kept the regime alive and, second, it allowed for the gradual improvement of the operation and usefulness of the border-control permit system that is the treaty's key compliance mechanism; a device that is at heart really rather mundane and amounts to little more than filling out and processing forms and certificates so that, as wildlife species are taken from the wild and move around the world in trade, there can be inspections made and movements traced and tallied.
But what difference does the steadily increasing country coverage and bureaucratic reliability of all this record-keeping and accounting make to wildlife species on the ground?
It seems…hazardous…to correlate the effectiveness of the Convention directly with the actual (positive or negative) conservation status of a species in its natural habitat or even with the overall volume of trade -considering the multitude of cause-effect relationships, most of which are outside the control of CITES, and recognizing that the Convention is not a priori anti-trade. Attempts at 'measuring' conservation success by the number of species transferred from Appendix I to II (on the assumption that de-listing or downlisting would indicate recovery or an 'out-of-danger' finding) are equally inconclusive, since many transfer decisions by the [CoP] were made for different administrative reasons. 46 So, if CITES is not accomplishing much in a legal sense, as Glennon imagined it someday might, and if it is not possible to demonstrate, despite the increasing levels of bureaucratic and administrative sophistication and adaptation Sand detailed, that the treaty regime is a sturdy bulwark against the multitude of cause-effect relationships that affect the status of species on the ground, what is it doing?
Applauding CITES as an Instrument for International Mobilization
Reviewing the judgments legal commentators had already entered about the treaty regime, Sand in 1997 found most of them favorable, 47 although in truth some amounted to little more than faint praise. The outlier judgments were, on the one hand, that the convention was "perhaps the most successful of all international treaties concerned with the conservation of wildlife," 48 and that, on the other hand, its accomplishments were little more than symbolic and of no clear benefit to the status of wildlife. 49 Sand himself graciously offered that the jury was still out, but that the regime had probably reached the "outer limits" 50 of what it might reasonably be expected to achieve for endangered species through the regulation of trade.
Sand's crucial insight was that a great deal had changed in the world since CITES was first negotiated. The controversy, for example, over whether the treaty was about the strict protection rather than the sustainable use of wildlife, or both, saw the regular proceedings of the regime riven by controversy, almost to the point of decisional paralysis, after the up-listing of the elephant to Appendix I at CoP 7 in Lausanne in 1989.
And this ongoing turbulence in the internal environment of the regime was mirrored by growing concern about how CITES, an "old watchdog" 51 of international wildlife law, would adapt to a rapidly changing external environment, where large free trade areas, most notably the European Union, were bound to diminish the relevance of CITES-type border controls, and where there was a need to show that CITES could reinforce and supplement the work being done to protect wildlife through other multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that had, or arguably could have, an impact on the status of wildlife.
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By 2013, Michael Bowman thought outliers of judgments about CITES had become more pointed than those observed by Sand, especially on the negative side. 53 A newer "radical critique" 54 was serious and threatening enough to deserve careful rebuttal, and in the process of making that case Bowman all but abandoned the adaptation paradigm. The regime instead needed to be much more assertively pluralistic in its embrace of conservation values. 55 It needed to be much more conscious of its dependence for success on building and maintaining strong networks of relationships with prominent actors in the international conservation community, 56 particularly other MEAs. And it needed above all to fight back against the perception that it could command and control through regulatory means the behavior of sovereign states whose treatment of wildlife, even endangered wildlife, diverged from treaty norms.
In particular, it should be recognized that the formal allocation of legal regimes to a 'commandand-control' category…typically presented for contrast with those that rely on 'economic incentives,' represents an analytical schematic which is much more meaningfully applicable at the domestic level, where it seems to have originated. [It offers] gravely diminished explanatory power when translated into the international arena, especially where conservation is concerned, for the reality is that…biodiversity-related treaties [are] less concerned with 'commanding and controlling' than with 'committing and cajoling', and for good measure tend to incorporate 54 Id. at 229. 55 Id. at 238. 56 Id. at 231 (noting the vital role a wide range of NGOs have long played in holding states to account for their compliance with CITES through monitoring and investigative work).
significant additional elements within their agenda -the aspirations to 'elucidate and educate' and 'foster and facilitate' being among the most obvious that come to mind (citations omitted).
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Once it is negotiated and agreed, then, the work of a treaty regime like CITES is not accomplished, pace Glennon, through the legal process nor, pace Sand, through the increasingly inventive adaptation of initially primitive bureaucratic structures and processes, which then have a trickle down impact on range state behavior. The work with the most payoff is the work of persuasion, 58 of forging broad alliances, 59 of marshalling the best available science, 60 of high level political engagement, 61 and of resource accumulation. 62 The fate of endangered species, especially of charismatic megafauna like the elephant, attracts tremendous international interest; in public opinion, in the media, in the conservation NGO community, in political leadership circles in many, probably most, of the now more than 180 countries that are parties to CITES, and among scholars. 63 This salient interest is what brings over 2,000 participants and more than 170 national delegations to a CITES CoP, like the last one in Bangkok. 64 It is what undergirds vigorous participation in the work of multiple CITES subsidiary bodies, month after month, year after year. 65 It is, in short, what enables the international mobilization on multiple fronts of the various political and scientific pressures that have some chance of helping to save dying elephants, because they extend the reach of CITES beyond the narrow set of trading variables it can attempt to control by virtue of its legal terms of reference, and on which in the past it has been fixated, to the multitude of cause and effect relationships it must try to influence, if it wants to appear responsive to international opinion and have some measure of real success in saving elephants, and other species. It is the strategic vision for CITES that John Scanlon embraces, 66 looking ahead to CoP 17 in Johannesburg 67 and asserting that no other wildlife treaty can keep the pressure on. What really matters in the end, then, for the elephant and other species is not the law that is in the treaty but the "interest and passion for wildlife" that CITES can arouse. 68 All of which leaves us with two pressing questions, neither of which yet has very good answers.
The first is whether the mobilization of the interest and passion of the international community through CITES to combat wildlife crime is making any difference. The best available estimates of trends in the legal and illegal taking of key species were not likely to be released until just prior to CITES CoP 17. But the CITES Secretariat is clearly anticipating that the short term trends, at least, will be favorable. A press release in late July 2016 reported that:
Two CITES monitoring programs -[ETIS and MIKE] -indicate that the sharp upward trends in poaching, which started in 2006, have started to level off, with continental levels of illegal killing of elephants stabilizing or slightly decreasing. However, the levels of poaching remain far too high to allow elephant populations to recover, with some populations [still] facing risk of local extinction. Southern Africa continues to stand out as the sub-region where overall poaching rates have remained consistently lowest in the period 2006-2015, which was marked by a surge in poaching across Africa. 69 This news was good enough for a claim that the "momentum generated over the past five years" was paying dividends and that "sustained and collective effort with strong political support" had had an impact "on the front lines…from the rangers in the field, to police and customs at ports of entry and exit, and across illicit markets." 70 There was no clear indication, however, of what this momentum had yielded in terms of interdictions, arrests, prosecutions, and convictions in courts of law.
The second question, then, is where is the law in all of this? protect endangered species, no-one considered him to be a starry-eyed idealist or published a rebuttal telling him that he was barking up the wrong tree.
In truth, Glennon's purpose was less to herald a coming golden age of international endangered species litigation and subsequent court judgments than it was to re-align the conversation about law and endangered species among international legal scholars. He wanted to turn away from talk about how law could be a disincentive to destructive wildlife trade -a purpose for which CITES was by his own analysis an imperfect instrument -and towards the neo-liberal dialogue about achieving conservation through incentives that had already intrigued resource economists and wildlife managers around the world but especially in Africa. 72 It was a clever turn on Glennon's part, and nicely timed. He dutifully said in plain language what every other scholar has had to say since the treaty was agreed in 1973, namely that to be effective CITES requires domestic implementation by parties to it. 73 But like his colleagues, both then and since, Glennon paid no serious attention to what domestic law was, or was not, accomplishing. He observed superficially and with a very considerable degree of optimism that the overall level of compliance with CITES requirements in domestic wildlife legislation seemed to be "quite high," and high enough in his view to make the general principles embodied in states' domestic endangered species legislation, which he did not examine in detail, a valid source of international customary law. 74 But that was not then and is not now the case. 75 Indeed, it is only since the Royal Foundation and United for Wildlife thought to commission a desktop study of domestic wildlife law and litigation across a wide array of developing countries that it has become apparent, with a level of detail we have not seen before, 76 just how much of an empty threat the law is to those who take wildlife illegally, especially endangered wildlife, in African and Asian range states. The work was done in two parts on a pro bono basis by teams of lawyers and legal assistants working in the world-wide offices of DLA Piper. 77 The first report was compiled by a team of 55 lawyers working in 15 offices around the world and covered 11 countries. 78 The second report involved 80 lawyers in 25 different offices and dealt with a further 15 jurisdictions. 79 The information contained in these reports and the methodology by which it was assembled both need to be treated with circumspection. The reports cannot be said to represent anything more than a first effort to come to grips with the sad state of wildlife law and related legal processes in 26 developing countries. The structure of the reports gives the appearance that data were collected systematically, so as to give a basis for comparative analysis as between the countries. Thus, for each of the 26 countries covered by the 2014 and 2015 reports the analysis is presented under a uniform set of headings: an executive summary, followed by sections dealing with each country's principal wildlife legislation, the penalties exacted for violating those laws, ancillary legislation dealing with topics such as money laundering, racketeering and customs violations, an assessment of each country's judicial process and its capacity for handling wildlife cases, and a set of conclusions.
In fact, however, the 26 country reports are substantially idiosyncratic and rely heavily in places on anecdotal information, sometimes from un-attributable sources. Comparisons among countries are also limited by the substantially different legal traditions and cultures of, say, the Anglophone and the Francophone range states of Africa and Asia, and of China, which is often of interest as a consumer rather than a producer state in wildlife trade but of great interest nonetheless.
But the DLA Piper reports provide a good, broad, cross-sectional slice of a reality about wildlife law that conventional legal scholarship has assiduously ignored for far too long, 80 most especially in relation to CITES, where the implementation of domestic law is crucial for success. The reports are perhaps best understood as an open invitation for international legal scholars and their students to roll up their sleeves and get to work, examining even more carefully and systematically how and why wildlife and related laws work the way they do in any or all of the 26 countries covered by the reports, and other countries too, and how to achieve better outcomes for wildlife in conjunction with CITES.
In the interim, several important points are already in focus. "With few exceptions," the larger and more recent of the two reports concludes, "weaknesses exist in the principal legislation of each of the [ 81 So, while much domestic legislation exists and often looks good on paper, as in Kenya and Zimbabwe, 82 it might not be backed up by implementing regulations, as also in Mozambique. 83 And the lack of resources and capacity for law enforcement is chronic.
Most states, for example, cannot properly monitor the status of their wildlife. 84 Borders often cannot be controlled, a telling deficiency vis-à-vis the permit and inspection system CITES tries to operate. 85 And in the rare instances where prosecutions are brought and cases tried, the underlying investigative and forensic work and the observance of basic judicial process in charging violators and bringing them to trial are often so poor that judges in their discretion feel compelled to waive fines, reduce or suspend sentences, and avoid custodial sentences altogether. 86 Across the countries observed "corruption within government agencies and the court system [is] a serious problem." 87 All jurisdictions in [the 2015 report] were ranked in the bottom half of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index…with the exception of Namibia and South Africa… The link between corruption and wildlife trade is clear. Wildlife crime and trade is often facilitated by corruption, through bribery of…patrol officers, border guards and customs officials, falsification of documentation and other means. The legislative and prosecutorial framework that a country puts in place to tackle corruption and associated offences is therefore as important as other measures taken to tackle the illegal wildlife trade directly. 88 This last point is especially telling because, although every country has on paper a basic framework of law for wildlife, the materials needed to understand how it really works are typically difficult and sometimes impossible for external (and internal) observers to find. Across the 26 countries covered by the Empty Threat reports there is obviously great variability and some risk, therefore, in relying too heavily on a single country's experience to highlight critical issues. But it ought to be the case that, if Glennon's 1990 optimism about compliance with CITES requirements in domestic wildlife legislation were to be evident anywhere it would be in Kenya, which became a party to CITES nearly forty years ago in 1978 and where there is an internationally well-recognized capacity for wildlife management, focused in the Kenya Wildlife Service. 89 Kenya is also an interesting case because it recently adopted but has yet to fully implement a new statute 90 to replace the Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act of 1976, 91 it is home to an NGO that vigorously monitors wildlife law in Kenya, 92 and there is access, quite unusually among the developing countries covered by the Empty Threat reports, to published records of judicial decisions, at least at the appellate level, through an online database maintained by the National Council for Law Reporting. 93 On their face, the three appellate cases cited in the Empty Threat report on Kenya 94 do not tell us much about Kenya's internalization of the norms embedded in the treaty, even though wildlife-related trials are increasingly subject to appeal. 95 But what we learn from a more thorough analysis of the way wildlife law works in Kenya is that outcomes in appellate cases are a reflection of what is happening elsewhere in the Kenyan legal system. Thus, in eighteen local magistrate courts between 2008 and 2013 only 4% of those convicted of wildlife crimes went to jail and only 7% of offenders in ivory and rhino horn cases were imprisoned after conviction. 96 Among the 743 cases registered for the study, 70% of case files were missing and not one conviction could be found relating to the port of Mombasa, which is otherwise known to be a major transit point for illegally traded wildlife. 97 A chief reason for this is that the section of the much vaunted Kenyan wildlife law passed in 2013 that sharply increases penalties for wildlife crimes does not specify what constitutes an offence under the Act. So, it is hard to charge offences in the magistrates' courts in ways that will be uncontested on appeal or lead to conflicting appellate decisions and dismissals. 98 
